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Abstract
Inﬂation forecasts of the Federal Reserve seem to have systematically under-predicted
inﬂation from the fourth quarter of 1968 until Volcker’s appointment as Chairman, and
to systematically over-predict it afterwards until the second quarter of 1998. Furthermore,
under quadratic loss, commercial forecasts seem to have information not contained in those
forecasts. To investigate the cause of this apparent irrationality, this paper recovers the loss
function implied by Federal Reserve’s inﬂation forecasts. The results suggest that the cost
of having inﬂation above an implicit time-varying target was larger than the cost of having
inﬂation below it for the period since Volcker, and that the opposite was true for the pre-
Volcker era. Once these asymmetries are taken into account, the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation
forecasts are found to be rational.
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Resumen
Los pron´ osticos de inﬂaci´ on de la Reserva Federal parecen haber sub-predicho la inﬂaci´ on
sistem´ aticamente a partir del cuarto trimestre de 1968 hasta que Volcker fue nombrado Pre-
sidente, y posteriormente haberla sobre-predicho sistem´ aticamente hasta el segundo trimestre
de 1998. M´ as a´ un, bajo p´ erdida cuadr´ atica, pron´ osticos comerciales parecen tener informa-
ci´ on no contenida en los pron´ osticos de la Reserva Federal. Para investigar la causa de esta
aparente irracionalidad, se recupera la funci´ on de p´ erdida implicada por los pron´ osticos de
inﬂaci´ on de la Reserva Federal. Los resultados sugieren que el costo de tener inﬂaci´ on por
arriba de un objetivo de inﬂaci´ on impl´ ıcito fue mayor que el costo de tener inﬂaci´ on por
abajo del mismo para el per´ ıodo a partir de Volcker, y que lo opuesto fue cierto para el
peri´ odo anterior a Volcker. Una vez que estas asimetr´ ıas son consideradas, se encuentra que
los pron´ osticos de la Reserva Federal son racionales.
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One of the most important objectives of the Federal Reserve is to achieve stable prices.
However, because inﬂation responds to monetary policy only after a lag, the Federal Re-
serve needs to make decisions based on forecasts of future inﬂation behavior. The general
perception in economics, supported by Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002), is that
Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts are quite good. The Romers ﬁnd that Federal Reserve
forecasts of inﬂation are unbiased, and conclude that the forecasts are rational. They also
ﬁnd that if one had access to inﬂation forecasts from the Federal Reserve and from com-
mercial forecasters the optimal combination would be to dispose of the commercial forecasts
and use only Federal Reserve forecasts, a result maintained by Sims.1 These results imply
that the Federal Reserve uses information eﬃciently and that it has more information than
commercial forecasters.
However, the ﬁrst part of this paper shows that closer inspection of a data set that
extends the one used by the Romers and by Sims indicates that rationality can be rejected.
This is not because of the new data, but because there is a change in behavior in Federal
Reserve’s forecast errors that seems to coincide with Paul Volcker’s appointment as Chairman
and that was previously overlooked. It is shown that the forecasts systematically under-
predicted inﬂation before Volcker and systematically over-predicted it afterwards until the
second quarter of 1998. Moreover, once this change in behavior is taken into account,
Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts do not seem to have eﬃciently incorporated information
contained in inﬂation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, an important
group of commercial forecasters. In particular, the forecasts from the Federal Reserve seem
to have missed information contained in the consensus forecast and in the spread across the
surveyed forecasters. These results hold regardless of whether real-time or revised data are
used for the actual values of inﬂation.
The bias found in Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts is statistically signiﬁcant and, at
about half a percentage point for the sample since Volcker, is also economically signiﬁcant.
This bias would be typically considered to imply that the forecasts are irrational, however,
this need not be true. Unbiasedness of rational forecasts follows from the well-known result
that, under a quadratic loss function, the optimal forecast is the conditional mean.2 But the
optimal forecast is not the conditional mean if the loss function is asymmetric in the sense
that errors of the same magnitude but of diﬀerent signs imply diﬀerent costs.3 In this case,
1The Romers also ﬁnd that commercial forecasts are unbiased, and conclude that they are rational.
2The theory of Rational Expectations says that rational agents have expectations that are optimal fore-
casts (Mishkin, 1981).
3Other papers present evidence that the evaluation of forecasts depends on the loss function. Leitch and
1the optimal forecast is the mean plus an optimal bias term.4
Most papers that test rational expectations using forecasts as proxies for expectations,
such as those by the Romers and Sims, implicitly assume quadratic loss. But, does it make
sense for a central bank to have symmetric preferences? Some authors have argued that
it does not when referring to central banks that have a loss function that has as one of
its arguments the divergence of inﬂation from an inﬂation target. Nobay and Peel (2003)
provide anecdotal support for the argument that both the European Central Bank and the
Bank of England may have asymmetric preferences. Ruge-Murcia (2000) ﬁnds evidence
that, in practice, Canada’s central bank “... may attach diﬀerent weights to positive and
negative inﬂation deviations from the target.”(Ruge-Murcia 2000, p. 1). In a later paper,
Ruge-Murcia (2003) ﬁnds empirical evidence of asymmetric costs for Canada, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. Blinder (1998) recalls his experience as Vice-Chairman of the Federal
Reserve and explains that a central bank is more likely to “... take far more political heat
when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inﬂation than when it eases preemptively to
avoid higher unemployment” (Blinder 1998, p. 19). These papers indicate that for a central
bank with an inﬂation target, inﬂation below the target is less costly than inﬂation above it.
This paper uses a simple model of an inﬂation targeting central bank with asymmetric
preferences to reconcile the evidence of the apparent ineﬃcient use of information on the part
of the Federal Reserve. The model shows that a negative bias in the forecasts (systematic
over-prediction) is rational if the central bank is cautious in the sense that inﬂation above
the target is considered more costly than inﬂation below the target. The mechanism at
work is the following: take an inﬂation targeting central bank that sets its monetary policy
instrument so that the forecast of inﬂation equals the target, as in Svensson’s (1997) “inﬂation
forecast targeting” framework. If for the central bank inﬂation above the target is as costly as
inﬂation below it (i.e., the central bank has symmetric loss), then it would set its instrument
so that the expected value of inﬂation equals the target. In this case the forecast coincides
with the expected value of inﬂation. However, if inﬂation above the target is more costly
than inﬂation below it (i.e., the central bank has asymmetric loss), then the central bank
would, as a precautionary move, set the instrument so that the expected value of inﬂation
is below the target. In this case, the forecast does not coincide with the expected value of
inﬂation and hence a rational bias exists. In the situation just described, the actions taken by
the central bank depend asymmetrically on the forecasts, and positive and negative forecasts
Tanner (1991) ﬁnd that forecasts that appear to be bad forecasts under traditional measures, like mean
squared error, are not so under other measures, like the proﬁts they generate to ﬁrms that use them. Keane
and Runkle (1990), analyzing commercial price forecasts, indicate that a biased forecasts is consistent with
rationality under asymmetric loss.
4See Christoﬀersen and Diebold (1997), Granger (1969, 1999), and Zellner (1986).
2errors do not have the same consequences.
The literature in psychology has shown that forecasters behave as to minimize a posible
asymmetric loss function when they care about the accuracy of the forecasts and when they
are able of adjusting these forecasts in a way that incorporates any consequences of their
errors (Weber, 1994). It is clear that the Federal Reserve cares about the forecasts, and that
the producers of the forecasts, the staﬀ at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, are capable of adjusting the forecasts. The adjustment is likely to incorporate the
consequences of the errors because the producers may be acting as agents of the Federal Open
Market Committee. In this context, it is possible that the producers report the forecasts
as if using the loss function of their client in response to strategic considerations. In fact,
Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), Laster et al. (1999), and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006)
justify asymmetric loss functions for individual forecasters when they show that the main
goal of the agents is to inﬂuence their clients’ assessment of their forecasting ability.
To investigate if the empirical evidence is consistent with an asymmetric-cost Federal Re-
serve, this paper recovers the Federal Reserve’s loss function as implied by its forecasts. The
method used is to derive moment conditions under an asymmetric quadratic loss function
that nests the traditional quadratic loss as a special case. Elliott, Komunjer and Timmer-
mann (2005) suggest this method to test for the presence of asymmetric costs and, jointly,
to test for rationality. The empirical results are that starting with Volcker’s appointment as
Chairman and until the end of the sample, the second quarter of 1998, the Federal Reserve’s
cost of under-prediction was four times the cost of over-prediction. For the pre-Volcker era
the result is that the cost of under-prediction was a third of that of over-prediction, thus
supporting the presence of asymmetric costs in both periods. These results imply that for
the Federal Reserve since Volcker the cost of having inﬂation above the target was larger
than the cost of having inﬂation below it, and that the opposite was true for the pre-Volcker
era. Hence, this paper provides an empirical reason to move away from quadratic loss, and is
in line with the literature that has suggested that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the way
monetary policy was conducted pre- and post-Volcker (e.g., Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler, 2000;
Romer and Romer, 2004). Over-identiﬁcation tests are not able to reject the hypothesis
that, once the asymmetries are taken into account, the Federal Reserve is using information
eﬃciently both before and since Volcker.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the empirical properties of the Federal
Reserve forecast errors are analyzed using an original regression for forecast evaluation,
and their biases and lack of encompassing of commercial forecasts under quadratic loss
are documented. To rationalize this evidence, in section 3 the loss function implied by
Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts is recovered and evidence is found of asymmetric costs of
3under- and over- inﬂation prediction. Once these costs are taken into account, using over-
identiﬁcation tests the Federal Reserve is found to be using information eﬃciently. Section
4 discusses the implications of asymmetric costs and considers alternative explanations for
the empirical ﬁndings (e.g., learning by the Federal Reserve), and argues that they have
diﬃculties to explain the duration and the change of sign of the bias. Section 5 is the
conclusion.
2 Empirical Evidence on the Properties of Federal Re-
serve Inﬂation Forecasts
Federal Reserve forecasts are contained in the “Green Book” prepared by the staﬀ of the
Board of Governors before each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
The forecasts are made with an assumption about monetary policy, and are judgmental in
the sense that they are not the direct output of an econometric model, but the product
of judgmental adjustments made to forecasts obtained from econometric models.5 It is the
policy of the Federal Reserve (the Fed) to release the forecasts to the public with a ﬁve
year lag. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has put together a series of Green
Book forecasts of inﬂation and output starting November 1965, but instead of giving all
the forecasts available they present the forecasts closest to the middle of each quarter so as
to make the series comparable to the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and other
surveys.6 This is convenient because FOMC’s meetings have not always being as regular as
they are today.7 The analysis presented throughout this paper uses the data at the quarterly
frequency.8
The Green Book contains forecasts for more that 50 variables. This paper uses inﬂation
forecasts for the output deﬂator.9 The forecast horizon varies from the current quarter to
5Reifschneider, et al. (1997) describe the role played by models in forecasting and the monetary policy
process at the Federal Reserve. Sims (2002) analyzes both, Green Book forecasts and forecasts that are
directly obtained from the econometric models.
6More information about Green Book forecasts and the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Philadel-
phia Fed web page: http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/index.html
7The committee currently meets every six weeks.
8Romer and Romer (2000) uses Green Book forecasts at a monthly frequency, whereas Sims (2002) uses
data at the quarterly frequency. The advantage of using quarterly data, Sims points out, is that if one uses
forecasts from other sources, like the SPF, then the data sets have uniform timing, something that simpliﬁes
the econometric analysis.
9The series being forecasted is quarter-to-quarter (annualized) inﬂation from the level of the nominal
output’s price index. From 1965 to 1991, the index used was the price deﬂator implicit in the Gross National
Product, from 1992 to the third quarter of 1996 it was the price deﬂator implicit in the Gross Domestic
Product, and since then it has being the Gross Domestic Product’s chain-weighted price index. All the series
are seasonally adjusted.
4as many as nine quarters ahead. In this paper only forecasts up to four-quarters-ahead are
used because longer horizons do not contain enough data to conﬁdently perform econometric
analysis.
In any forecasting exercise the value used as the actual value for the variable of interest,
inﬂation in this paper, can be taken either as the ﬁrst value released (if available), which
is typically referred to as real-time data, or the latest revision of the data.10 In general, it
is not clear which value the producer of a forecast is actually targeting, and arguments can
be made for either real-time or revised data. For example, one can argue that the Federal
reserve is interested in forecasting the “true” value of inﬂation, so that evaluation of Fed’s
forecasts should be done with fully revised data. On the contrary, for commercial forecasters
one can argue that they are interested in the accuracy of the forecasts as seen when the data
are ﬁrst released, so that evaluation of commercial forecasts should be done with real-time
data. In this paper all the results are reported for both data sets, using the second revision
as real-time data and the latest available revision as of may 1998 as fully revised data.11
Sims (2002) points out that it is worth to compare the results with both sets to see if the
analysis is sensitive to which variable is used to construct actual values.12 This paper has
more to say about real-time versus revised data, but the discussion is postponed until section
3 where it can be framed in the context of the theoretical model.
2.1 Comments on the Tests Used in the Literature
Romer and Romer (2000) conclude that inﬂation forecasts from the Federal Reserve are
rational and that they dominate commercial forecasts. They use Green Book forecasts
of inﬂation in a sample that goes from November of 1965 to November of 1991.13 For the
commercial forecasts they use forecasts taken from Data Resources Inc., Blue Chip Economic
Indicators, and the SPF. For the last two they use the consensus forecast formed by taking
the median across forecasters. The Romers reach their conclusion about rationality by
estimating, for each forecaster and forecast horizon, a Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer
and Zarnowitz, 1969). Let πt+h denote inﬂation h periods after period t. For example, if t
equals the ﬁrst quarter of 1990 and h equals two, then πt+h is actual inﬂation in the third
quarter of 1990. In the same way, let ft+h,t denote the forecast of inﬂation made at period t
10See Croushore and Stark (2002) (with discussion).
11Real-time data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s web page:
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/. For more on real time data see Croushore and Stark (2002). Re-
vised data is also taken from the real-time data base, and corresponds to the last vintage available in May
2004.
12Romer and Romer (2000) use the second revision, whereas Sims (2002) uses fully revised data.
13The Romers’ sample ends in 1991 because of the lag in the release of Green Book forecasts, and to avoid
the change from the use of Gross National Product to Gross Domestic Product.
5for period t + h. Then the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression is:
πt+h = α + βft+h,t + εt+h, (1)
and a test of rationality is that α = 0 and β = 1.14 The Romers apply ordinary least squares
(OLS) to their sample and ﬁnd that inﬂation forecasts from commercial forecasters and from
the Green Book are rational.
To fully understand what the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression tests, one can think of impos-
ing β = 1 and then on substracting the forecast from both sides of the regression. If the
forecast error is deﬁned as et+h,t ≡ πt+h − ft+h,t the transformed regression is:
et+h,t = α + εt+h. (2)
Testing that α = 0 in the last regression is equivalent to jointly testing that α = 0 and
β = 1 in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression. If β is diﬀerent from one (and, for the sake of the
argument, α = 0), a traditional t-test on α would still reject the hypothesis of rationality
in equation (2) as it is testing the whole maintained hypothesis, from which the restriction
β = 1 is part of. In the second regression it is clear that what is being tested is if the forecast
errors have a zero mean, that is, if there is no systematic bias in the forecasts. The idea
is that rational forecasts should not systematically over- or under-predict because simply
adding the estimated value of α to the forecasts improves them.
Green Book forecasts before 1991 (Romers’ sample) appear unbiased, but not in the
random way that rationality calls for. A simple inspection of the time series of the forecast
errors in Figure 1 reveals systematic positive errors (under-prediction) up until about 1979,
and systematic negative errors (over-prediction) from about 1979 to about 1991.15 The
speciﬁc dates change with the horizon used, but it is clear that the average of the forecast
errors is close to zero because for the ﬁrst part of the sample the average is positive whereas
for the second part the average is negative, oﬀsetting each other when the average is taken
using the entire sample up until 1991. When Sims extended the sample to 1995, he reports
ﬁnding some evidence that the Green Book inﬂation forecasts are (negatively) biased. Figure
1 shows that Sims’s result diﬀers from the Romers’ because the tendency to over-predict
inﬂation was maintained during the ﬁrst half of the nineties.
There are some advantages of using equation (2) instead of equation (1) when testing for
unbiasedness. First, only one parameter has to be estimated. Second, equation (1) requires
14Under the null of rationality and quadratic loss, Et [εt+h] = 0. The properties of the error are discussed
later in the paper.
15Orphanides (2002) reports that the Green Book forecasts are clearly biased towards under-prediction
for the period 1969-1979, but he does not quantify the bias nor does he tests it.
6the forecast to be uncorrelated with the error term for the estimators of α and β to be
consistent, which is true for optimal forecasts but not for other forecasts, whereas equation
(2) does not have this requirement. Third, if the variable to be forecasted is highly persistent,
like inﬂation, then both the dependent and the explanatory variables are highly persistent
in regression (1) which may cause the traditional test to over-reject the null hypothesis,
as the normal distribution may be a poor approximation to the distribution of the test.16
Regression (2) does not present this problem because the dependent variable is not persistent
and the explanatory variable is just a constant.
However, some objections have emerged over the years about the use of the Mincer-
Zarnowitz regression to test rationality. Granger and Newbold (1986) indicate that the
regression is only testing a necessary condition for the optimality of the forecasts. Without
further tests that make use of the forecaster’s information set when testing rationality, it
is certainly premature to conclude that a forecast is using all the available information in
an eﬃcient way just because it passes an unbiasedness test. In the forecasting literature
optimality of a forecast is always deﬁned with respect to the variable considered to be in the
forecaster’s information set. If a constant is used in the deﬁnition, then the forecast is said
to be unbiased (or weakly rational). If another variable is used, then the forecast is said to
be eﬃcient (or optimal) with respect to that variable.
The Romers also show that Green Book forecasts dominate commercial forecasts of in-
ﬂation. They show this by running forecast combination regressions pairwise with the Green
Book forecasts in each regression. The regression is:






t+h,t + εt+h, (3)
where α is a constant, ωF is the weight assigned to the Federal Reserve forecast (denoted by
fF
t+h,t) and ωC is the weight assigned to the commercial forecast (denoted by fC
t+h,t).17 The
Romers apply OLS to their sample and ﬁnd that the constant and ωC for each commercial
forecaster are in general not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, whereas ωF is in general not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. According to these results, if one had access to both forecasts
the optimal action would be to throw away the commercial forecasts.18 Sims (2002) reaches
16See Cavanagh, Elliott and Stock (1995).
17Combination regressions like (3) ﬁrst appeared in Granger and Ramanthan (1984), and were later used
by Chong and Hendry (1986) to test what they called “forecast encompassing”. According to Hendry and
Chong, a forecast “forecast encompasses” another forecast if the weight assigned to the ﬁrst forecast is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one and the weight assigned to the second forecast is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The idea behind forecast encompassing is to test if one forecast contains information useful for
another forecast of interest or not, for example, Fair and Shiller (1989) use a regression like (3) to measure
information content of the forecasts.
18Romer and Romer (2000) conclude that if both, the Fed and commercial forecasters are using all their
7the same conclusion using a similar methodology.
If the objective is to combine forecasts, it is clear that equation (3) is an adequate way
to proceed, and that as a by product one can obtain an encompassing test by testing if the
weight assigned to the “encompassed” forecast is zero. But if the objective is to test if one
forecast has information not contained in another forecast, then one can directly test for
forecast encompassing. For the case of the Federal Reserve and commercial forecasters, the
following regression, imposing the restriction ωF + ωC = 1, can be used:
e
F











An encompassing test is simply the test of ωC = 0. An alternative is to use the forecast
fC
t+h,t as the explanatory variable in regression (4) instead of the error diﬀerence, but if the
variable of interest is persistent, like inﬂation, then the normal distribution may not be a
good approximation to the distribution of the test statistic of interest. A by-product of
regression (4) is that the coeﬃcient ωC is the weight the commercial forecaster would receive





2.2.1 A Regression to Test Rationality, Serial Correlation, and Information
Content Under Quadratic Loss
Apart from testing for unbiasedness and to see if the Green Book forecasts encompass com-
mercial forecasts there is another property of rational forecasts that is worth looking at.
Under quadratic loss optimal forecast errors should have an autocorrelation structure like
that of a moving average (MA) of order (h − 1), where h denotes the forecasts horizon. A
formal derivation can be found in Granger and Newbold (1986, p. 130), but the intuition
is easy to convey: A forecast for t + 2 made at t (a two-step-ahead forecast) has to include
information up to t, but any shock occurring in the two periods between t and t + 2 is not
taken into account. At t + 1, another two-step-ahead forecast is going to be issued, and is
going to be a forecast for t + 3. The second forecast contains information up to t + 1, but
does not contain information about anything that occurs in the two periods between t + 1
information eﬃciently (because they are rational) and if Federal Reserve forecasts encompass commercial
ones, then it must be that the Fed has more information. They get the same results when they analyze
output forecasts.
19Comparing regressions (2) and (4) one can see that the constant in regression (4) can be used to test
the unbiasedness of the Fed’s forecasts. One can also see that the role of the constant in regression (3) is to
compensate for any bias contained in the forecasts to be combined so that the resulting combination is by
construction unbiased.
8and t+3. So there is one period, from t+1 to t+2, for which neither forecast has informa-
tion. Any event that happens in this period is going to impact both forecasts, inducing an
MA(1)-like behavior in the forecast errors. This property can be tested using the regression:
et+h,t = γet+h−j,t−j + εt+h, (5)
with j ≥ h. The hypothesis of no serial correlation corresponds to γ = 0.
The dependent variable in equations (2), (4), and (5) is the same, which suggests that a
single regression can be used to tests for unbiasedness, serial correlation, and encompassing.
Such a regression is used to analyze Green Book inﬂation forecasts. The SPF consensus
forecast of inﬂation is used as representative of commercial forecasts.20 The regression is:
e
F











OLS is applied to the available sample (1968:4 to 1998:4) for each horizon, with j = h+1.21
To correct for any autocorrelation in excess of j = h+1 and for heteroskedasticity, expected
from a non-constant variance in Figures 1 and 2, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
corrected standard errors using Newey and West’s (1997) method are employed.22 The
results are presented in Tables 1 (real-time data) and 2 (revised data).
In terms of the bias, the sign of the estimated α is negative for all horizons and data
sets, although it is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for h = 3. A look at the forecast
errors is helpful to explain the result. Figure 1 presents forecast errors for horizons one and
four. When the sample employed by the Romers is extended to include most of the nineties,
the systematic over-prediction of inﬂation (forecast errors systematically below zero) that
occurred in the last part of the sample outweighs the systematic under-prediction (forecast
errors systematically above zero) that occurred during the ﬁrst part of the sample and instead
of an average error close to zero one gets a negative average. But Figure 1 contains more
20The Survey of Professional Forecasters is conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. It
was formerly known as the ASA/NBER Economic Outlook Survey. The consensus used in this paper is
formed by taking the median across forecasters. The variable being forecasted is the GNP deﬂator prior to
1992, the GDP implicit price deﬂator prior to 1996 and the GDP price index since then. The forecasts of





. For more information see Croushore (1993) or go to:
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/index.html
21The forecast for the current quarter is typically labelled forecast at horizon zero, h = 0, a convention
that is followed in this paper. But from a theoretical point of view, the error from this forecast should behave
like an MA(0) because it is the ﬁrst forecast. Accordingly, the forecast error labelled h = 1 should behave,
if optimal, as an MA(1), not as an MA(0), because it contains what in theory is the second-step-ahead
forecast.
22The bandwidth was chosen so that h lags were included to calculate the variance covariance matrix.
Newey and West’s method was chosen to avoid ending with a non–positive deﬁnite matrix.
9information. It indicates the periods of each of the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve during
the sample. One can see that the bias presents a pattern that can be associated with the
Chairmen. From the beginning of the sample until about 1979, the Fed systematically under-
predicts inﬂation. From about 1979 onwards the Fed systematically over-predicts inﬂation.
But this coincides with Volcker’s appointment as Chairman. So that Chairmen considered to
have strong preferences against inﬂation, Volcker and Greenspan, presided over periods with
negative bias, whereas Chairmen considered to be more relaxed about inﬂation (Chairmen
before Volcker) presided over periods with positive bias.23 This pattern will be exploited
later in the paper.
With respect to serial correlation in the forecast errors, the results with real-time data
(Table 1) indicate that for horizons zero, one, and two there is evidence of serial correlation.
When fully revised data is used (Table 2) the evidence is stronger, as all horizons but one
show evidence of serial correlation. Under the assumption of quadratic loss, these results
point to the Fed’s ineﬃcient use of the information contained in its own past forecast errors.
Finally, the estimates of the coeﬃcients associated with the encompassing tests show some
evidence that, under the maintained hypothesis the the Fed has a quadratic loss function,
the Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts do not encompass those of the SPF consensus. With
real-time data (Table 1) horizons one and four have estimates that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, which is enough to reject the null of encompassing. The estimated coeﬃcient for
horizon zero indicates that the optimal combination assigns a weight of 0.21 to the SPF’s
forecasts and a weight of 0.79 to the Fed’s.24 When revised data is used (Table 2) horizon
zero has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0.35, which means that the optimal combination is to
assign a weight of 0.65 to the Fed’s forecasts and a weight of 0.35 to the SPF consensus.
The overall picture is that with the full sample the SPF consensus seems to contain some
information that the Federal Reserve does not have, in particular in the very short run.
Joint tests of rationality are also performed. These are Wald tests that all the coeﬃcients
are equal to zero. The tests reject the null at 10% for all horizons. The overall conclusion is
that when the sample is extended to 1998 and asymmetries are not allowed Federal Reserve
inﬂation forecasts appear to be irrational.
23W.M. Martin Jr was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve until the ﬁrst quarter of 1970, between
February 1970 and January 1978 A. Burns was the Chairman, and G.W. Miller was the Chairman from
March 1978 to August 1979. P. Volcker’s period covered August 1979 to August 1987. Finally, A. Greenspan
was in charge since August 1987 until February 2006. On Chairmen’s preferences about inﬂation see Romer
and Romer (2004).
24The estimated coeﬃcient for horizon four is negative which is diﬃcult to explain. The fact that the
estimate is diﬀerent from zero implies that it contains information that the Fed can use. The fact that the
estimated coeﬃcient is negative indicates that the weight assigned to the Fed forecast is more than one, but
that the SPF consensus is still worth looking at by the Fed because it explains a part of the forecast errors
not explained by the Federal Reserve forecast.
102.2.2 Structural Breaks: 1974-1975 and 1979-1980
To investigate the possibility of changes in the parameters of equation (6) the sample is split
at each possible breakdate and the parameters of the model are estimated separately for each
subsample.25 Bai (1997) indicates that the OLS estimate of the break date is the date that
minimizes the residual variance as a function of the breakdate. Figure 3 plots the residual
variance for horizons one to four using revised data.26 Although it is not a formal test, the
visual analysis is informative regarding the potential breakdates. The plots in Figure 3 show
two well-deﬁned minima. A global minimum for horizons one and two occurs around 1974 –
1975. A global minimum for horizons three and four occurs around 1978 – 1980. This last
period also coincides with local minima for horizons one and two. This evidence suggests
that two structural breaks are present in the full sample.27
To formally test for the presence of multiple structural breaks the procedure suggested
by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) is implemented. However, instead of using equation (6) the
procedure is applied to regressions that have only a constant as a regressor. This is because
convergence results are not available when there is a lagged dependent variable and serial
correlation in the errors (Bai and Perron, 2003). The approach followed here is to test for
multiple breaks in the mean with tests that permit serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
in the errors. Allowance is made for up to three breaks and the trimming is ﬁfteen percent of
the sample. Diﬀerent variances of the residuals across segments is also allowed. The results
are presented in Tables 3 (real-time data) and 4 (revised data).28 The conclusion from Table
3 is that there is a break in the ﬁrst quarter of 1975 for h = 0, and a break in the third
quarter of 1979 for h = 4. The conclusion from Table 4 is that there is a break around 1974 -
1975 for horizons zero, one, and two, and a break around 1979 - 1980 for horizons two, three,
and four.29 The overall conclusion about parameter constancy is that there is evidence of
25The sample is trimmed so that there are enough data points to estimate the ﬁrst and last regressions.
26Horizon zero is not used because is not very informative as it has a dip from 1973 to 1981 with no clear
minimum. The formal tests presented below use both real-time and revised data.
27The approach reported in this paper is to treat the breakdate as unknown, although the approach of
taking the breakdate as known was also investigated. A Chow (1960) test was applied to the regression for
each horizon and for each data set (real-time and revised). Results indicate that if the breakdate is set at
1979:3, the time P. Volcker took oﬃce, there is strong evidence in favor of (the alternative hypothesis of) a
break at that time.
28UDmax is a test of the null hypothesis of no structural break against an unknown number of breaks
given the upper bound of three breaks. SupF(l + 1|l) is a test for l versus l + 1 breaks. BIC (Bayesian
Information Criterion) and Sequential refer to procedures to choose the number of breaks. BIC estimates
the models with diﬀerent number of breaks and selects the best model using the BIC criterion. Sequential is
based on the sequential application of the supF(l+l|l) test. Finally, T1 and T2 are the estimated breakdates
based on a procedure that ﬁnds the global minimizer of the sum of squared residuals when two breaks are
allowed (see Bai and Perron (2003)).
29There is evidence of two breaks using horizons two and four. The second break using horizon four is
estimated at the four quarter of 1985.
11two structural breaks, one around the beginning of 1975 and a second around the end of
1979.
From an economic perspective both breaks coincide with negative supply shocks: In the
1973-1975 period the economy was hit by the ﬁrst oil shock, a sharp increase in food prices
due to crop failures, and the termination of price controls, and during the 1979-1980 period
the economy was hit again by crop failures and the second oil shock. But the second break
also coincides with the appointment of Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. In
the monetary policy literature the appointment of Volcker is considered as a change in the
Fed’s views towards inﬂation, with less emphasis on controlling inﬂation in the pre-Volcker
era than in the period since Volcker. For example, Romer and Romer (2004) review the
narrative record of the Federal Reserve and ﬁnd that key determinants of the monetary
policy in the United States have been Chairmen’s “... views about how the economy works
and what monetary policy can accomplish.” (Romer and Romer 2004, p. 130). Reviewing
the Chairmen’s views they also ﬁnd that:
Well-tempered monetary policies of ... the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from
the conviction that inﬂation has high costs and few beneﬁts, ... In contrast, the
proﬂigate policies of the late 1960s and 1970s stemmed ... from a belief in a
permanent trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment... (Romer and Romer
2004, p. 130).
Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) also support the idea that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the way monetary policy was conducted pre- and post-Volcker. They ﬁnd that the Fed let
real interest rates decline as expected inﬂation rose before Volcker whereas it systematically
raised real rates in response to higher expected inﬂation in the post-Volcker era. So, only
the second break coincides with what is believed to be an endogenous change in preferences
within the Federal Reserve.
2.2.3 Bias and Encompassing Considering the Breaks
To allow for the structural breaks, estimates of equation (6) are presented for three subsam-
ples. The ﬁrst covers from the beginning of the sample to the end of 1974. The second from
the beginning of 1975 to the third quarter of 1979 and the third from the fourth quarter of
1979 to the second quarter of 1998. The results are presented in Tables 5 (real-time data)
and 6 (revised data).
The samples pre-1979 have forecast errors with a signiﬁcant positive mean for most
horizons. All the coeﬃcients but two, corresponding to horizons zero and one for the 1975-
1979 period, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when revised data is used. Real-time data
12shows only a few signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, but all of them are positive. The diﬀerence between
the pre- and post-1975 period is a reduction in the magnitude of the bias for each horizon, but
the qualitative results are the same across these two periods. This result contrast with the
diﬀerence pre- and post-1979. The bias is signiﬁcant post-1979 for all horizons and data sets,
but the sign is negative. The negative sign corresponds to the Federal Reserve’s systematic
over-prediction of inﬂation. For example, a bias of -0.5 would correspond to the Federal
Reserve systematically over-predicting inﬂation, on average, by half a percentage point.
When fully revised data is used the results are qualitatively the same, but the magnitude
of the bias is larger, with a bias as large as three quarters of a percent.30 So there was
a systematic tendency to under-predict inﬂation before 1979 and a systematic tendency to
over-predict it after 1979.
There is almost no evidence of serial correlation within samples. In fact, when real-time
data is used only one coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This indicates that the
serial correlation found using the full sample is a reﬂection of not taking into account the
structural breaks.
The results from the encompassing tests show that the dominance of the Fed is un-
dermined with respect to the results obtained by the Romers. When data post-Volcker is
considered, both real-time and revised data show that the SPF consensus has valuable in-
formation (from the Fed’s point of view, under quadratic loss) for the ﬁrst two horizons. For
the forecasts corresponding to horizon zero the estimated weights indicate that the optimal
combination is to average the forecasts. This is a common result in the forecasting literature,
but a new result with these data. Results pre-Volcker show that Fed forecasts encompass
the SPF’s, except for horizon zero when revised data is used. That the SPF forecasts con-
tain more information when the post-Volcker sample is used indicates learning over time by
commercial forecasters.31
The results about encompassing using the sample since Volcker show another very inter-
esting aspect of the informational advantage of the Fed over the SPF. The weight associated
with the SPF consensus is decreasing with the forecast horizon. Only the estimates for hori-
zons zero and one are statistically signiﬁcant, but the economic signiﬁcance of the tendency
is very important, as it points to the fact that the informational advantage of the Federal
Reserve increases with the forecast horizon. Sims (2002) suggests that the main advantage
of the Federal Reserve over commercial forecasters may be a better knowledge within the
30It is interesting to notice that a comparison of the results using real-time versus revised data shows that
there may be a small bias in the real time data that is corrected in the revisions. If this bias is indeed
present, the Fed could immediately improve its forecasts by taking this information into account (i.e., taking
into account both time series, the real-time series and the revised one).
31This result, although interesting, is not pursued further in this paper.
13Fed of the timing of changes in the policy stance. The results presented here support Sims’s
suggestion, as one would expect knowledge about the monetary policy stance to be more
important for longer horizons.
The results that Federal Reserve forecasts encompass the SPF consensus for some hori-
zons but not for others can be interpreted as saying that commercial forecasters have a wider
information set than the Fed’s, at least for some horizons. But if the Fed’s information set is
equal or wider than that of commercial forecasters, something plausible due to the resources
devoted by the Fed to the task, and if the Fed’s loss function is quadratic, then the result can
also be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that the Fed uses information ineﬃciently.
Finally, the joint tests clearly indicate rejection of the null hypothesis (rationality and
quadratic loss) in each subsample, except for the period between 1975 to 1979 where the
tests cannot reject for some horizons.32 The fact that rationality is rejected for the sample
before 1979 provides evidence that the results presented in this paper diﬀer from those of
the Romers, even when the analysis is done using a subsample of their data.
3 Reconciling Evidence with Forecasts Under Asym-
metric Loss
The results presented so far are tied to the assumption that the Federal Reserve has a
symmetric loss function. That is, there is an implicit assumption that if the Fed’s inﬂation
forecast for four-quarters-ahead is 3%, the following two alternative events have the same
costs for the Federal Reserve: That actual inﬂation turns out to be 4%, or that actual
inﬂation turns out to be 2%. In both events, the magnitude of the error is the same, but the
signs are diﬀerent. Is it sensible to assume that for the Federal Reserve both events have the
same costs?
Recent monetary policy literature suggests a negative answer to that question, indicating
that it is likely that central banks have asymmetric preferences about inﬂation. Nobay
and Peel (2003) employ an asymmetric loss function, the “linex” loss, to model central
bank preferences. The linex loss nests as a special case the quadratic loss, but in general
allows for diﬀerent marginal losses for errors of equal magnitudes but diﬀerent signs. Ruge-
Murcia (2003) also employs the linex loss function to model central bank’s preferences. Using
implications from his theoretical model he ﬁnds empirical evidence to support an asymmetric
loss function for inﬂation using data on 21 OECD countries. He ﬁnds evidence of asymmetric
costs for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For the rest of the countries, including
32This last result could be due to the small number of observations in that period.
14the United States, he is not able to reject symmetric preferences.33
The papers by Nobay and Peel (2003) and Ruge-Murcia (2000, 2003) use asymmetric
costs to model the fact that for a prudent central bank inﬂation above the target is more
costly than inﬂation below the target.34 When the target is explicit, control errors (inﬂation
minus the target) can be used to test for asymmetric preferences (Ruge-Murcia, 2003). The
problem for central banks with implicit inﬂation targets is that control errors cannot be used
to test for asymmetries. This paper suggests that in this case inﬂation forecast errors may
be used, as a central bank pursuing an inﬂation target would set its optimal monetary policy
so as to have the forecast equal to the target (Svensson, 1997).
3.1 A Model of a Central Bank with an Asymmetric Loss
The preferences of the central bank over the possible realizations of inﬂation h periods ahead,
πt+h, are described by a loss function that indicates the costs associated with a particular
realization of πt+h and the central bank’s inﬂation target, πT
t+h,t, through the control error
cet+h = πt+h − πT






where φ is a ﬁxed parameter. It is assumed that the loss function is
convex and that L(0,φ) = 0. The loss function indirectly depends on the central bank’s
actions through the eﬀect of its monetary policy instrument, it, on πt+h.
Two aspects of the loss function are worth highlighting. First, the inﬂation target is
assumed to be time-varying. This is not common in the inﬂation targeting literature, but it
appears to be a good approximation to describe the Federal Reserve’s behavior as argued by
G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).35 Second, the loss function only has the inﬂation’s
control error as an argument, whereas it typically depends on the divergence of inﬂation
from a target, the divergence of output from its natural rate, and sometimes also on the
interest rate. The loss function used here is meant as a reduced form of a more involved loss
function and the conclusions from the empirical part will be interpreted accordingly.
In this environment the central bank chooses a policy action by minimizing expected
loss conditional on all the information available at the time of the decision.36 Denote this
33However, Ruge-Murcia needs to impose that inﬂation follows a Gaussian distribution, and his empirical
results may simply reﬂect the failure of the data to meet this assumption. He also uses linear approximations
to his nonlinear theoretical model, which may further undermine the empirical results.
34However, none consider the possibility that if the level of inﬂation is close to zero, then a prudent central
bank may ﬁnd inﬂation below the target more costly (i.e., the loss function may not only be a function of
the control error (inﬂation minus the target) but also of the level of inﬂation).
35The paper by G¨ urkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) considers a speciﬁcation in which the Fed’s long-run
inﬂation target displays some dependence on past values of inﬂation. This permits the long-run level of
inﬂation to vary over time.
36The central bank’s objective, as usually modeled in the literature, is to choose a sequence of monetary
policy actions so as to minimize the expected value of an inﬁnite sum of discounted losses. Under some
15information set by Ωt for the decision taken at t. This set contains at least the current and
past realizations of πt, and it, the models of the economy used by the central bank, as well















The optimal action will be a function of the contents of the information set, the target, and
the loss function. Under quadratic loss, L(cet+h,φ) = (cet+h)
2, the optimal action is the one
that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (FOC):




For a central bank with a quadratic loss the mean summarizes the relevant information
contained in the conditional density of inﬂation and a point forecast of the conditional mean
is suﬃcient to solve the optimization problem. The conditional mean is a function of Ωt,
which contains it, so the optimal policy under quadratic loss is to set it so as to make
the forecast equal to the target. Svensson (1997) calls this approach “inﬂation forecast
targeting”.
Now suppose that the central bank has an asymmetric loss function that it is homogeneous
(e.g., linex, asymmetric quadratic, asymmetric linear) and that inﬂation follows a location
scale process. In this case, using results from Granger (1999), the central bank’s FOC is:
E [πt+h | Ωt]|i∗




where κ is a function of the asymmetry parameter.37 The optimal policy would be to set the
interest rate so as to make the expected value of inﬂation equal to the inﬂation target minus
a precautionary term (if the loss asymmetry is in the direction of inﬂation above the target
being more costly than inﬂation below the target). The precautionary term depends on the
degree of asymmetry of the central bank’s objective function and on the variance of inﬂation.
In this case the information contained in a measure of location is not enough information for
the central bank, it also needs information about the dispersion of inﬂation. Everything else
equal, equation (9) implies that the interest rate chosen by a cautious central bank would
conditions, and without loss of generality, the multi-period problem can be broken into a sequence of period-
by-period problems (Svensson, 1997). The model presented in this paper satisﬁes these conditions.
37For example, assuming linex loss and that π follows a conditional Gaussian distribution (Christoﬀersen
and Diebold, 1997), the FOC is: E [πt+h | Ωt]i∗
t +
φ
2 var[πt+h | Ωt]|i∗
t = πT
t+h,t. In this case, κ =
φ
2. Under
this loss function, as φ approaches zero, the loss approaches a quadratic function, and we obtain the result
in equation (8).
16be higher than that chosen by a symmetric central bank.
An inﬂation targeting central bank with an asymmetric loss function will over-predict
inﬂation if inﬂation above the target is more costly than inﬂation below it because it will set
the interest rate so that the expected value of inﬂation is below the target. The diﬀerence
between the expected value and the target is a precautionary term that depends on the
degree of asymmetry and the dispersion of inﬂation. Because the optimal forecast is equal
to the target, there is also a diﬀerence between the optimal forecast and the expected value
of inﬂation. This diﬀerence is an optimal forecasting bias.38
3.2 Estimation of the Asymmetry Parameter
3.2.1 Derivation of Moment Conditions


















denotes the derivative of the loss function with respect to the
control error.39 Following Granger (1999) and Patton and Timmermann (Forthcoming), this
derivative will be called the generalized error. It gives the change in total loss resulting from
a one-unit change in the control error. Condition (10) implies that the optimal generalized
error follows a martingale diﬀerence sequence with respect to the information set Ωt. By
orthogonality of martingale diﬀerences, for any ﬁnite random variable constructed from the
contents of Ωt, vt ⊂ Ωt (in fact for any ﬁnite function of a vector vt ⊂ Ωt), the optimal










The literature that suggests a decision-theoretic approach to forecast evaluation (Granger
and Pesaran (2000)) derives an orthogonality condition similar to (11). The diﬀerence is that
the loss function in (11) depends on the control error πt+h−πT
t+h,t, whereas the loss function
used in the forecasting literature depends on the forecasting error πt+h −ft+h,t. To link (11)
with the condition used in the forecasting literature one can substitute the inﬂation target
38The optimal degree of asymmetry, and consequently the bias, can be time-varying and dependant on
past performance as measured, for example, by the level of inﬂation. However, none of these are considered
in this paper because they do not seem necessary to explain what is observed in the sample under study.
39Regularity conditions are needed to interchange integral and derivation. In this paper those conditions
are assumed to hold.








as the relevant condition. The substitution is feasible because optimality implies that the
optimal forecast equals the target, that is, the optimal action deﬁned by (11) is the same as
the one deﬁned by (12) (Svensson, 1997).
The intuition for the substitution is the following: if an inﬂation targeting central bank
cares more about inﬂation above the target than inﬂation below the target (asymmetric loss
in control error space) then the substitution implies that for this central bank inﬂation above
the forecast is more costly than inﬂation below the forecast (asymmetric loss in forecast error
space). This asymmetry in the forecasting loss function induces systematic over-prediction
of inﬂation, which in turn leads the central bank to avoid the costly mistake of having an
interest rate below the one required to keep inﬂation on or below the target. The bias induced
by the forecasting asymmetric loss helps to achieve the objective of the control asymmetric
loss of not having inﬂation systematically above the target.
If the loss function is known, condition (12) can be used to evaluate the optimality of
a particular sequence of forecasts. The test consists on ﬁnding whether L
0 (πt+l − ft+l,t,φ)
is uncorrelated to vt, and power against alternative hypotheses is achieved by selecting the
appropriate vt. This is a generalization of the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression as discussed by
Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2006). If the loss function is not known, condition
(12) and a sequence of forecasts can be used to estimate φ, provided it is identiﬁed, using
vt as instrument. Finally, one can also evaluate the sequence of forecasts conditioning on
the estimated value of φ provided enough instruments are available. This is the approach
suggested by Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005, 2006).
Condition (12) can shed light on the discussion about which data should be used as
actual data for forecast evaluation: Revised data, allegedly more closely to the “true”, or
real-time data. There are two places where actual data can be used. One is for the actual
value inside the marginal loss that appears in condition (12). It is not clear what a central
bank is forecasting, and arguments can be made both ways, although some would argue
that the realized losses depend on true inﬂation. The second place is in the central bank’s
information set. The set contains past forecast errors and past values of inﬂation. But the
content of the information set has to be known to the central bank at the moment at which
the decision is made. Therefore, real-time data have to be used, as revised data are not in
the information set at that time. To evaluate a central bank as a forecaster, and to learn
from this exercise, real-time data have to be used. The rest of the paper continues to report
18some results with both data sets, but the reader should bear in mind that theory favors
results using real-time data.
3.2.2 Asymmetric Quadratic Loss
Under quadratic loss the generalized error, L
0 (πt+h − ft+h,t,φ), is identical to the forecasting
error, πt+h − ft+h,t. This is one of the reasons quadratic loss is so popular: it gives results
that directly concern the errors and not a transformation of them. Under quadratic loss
the forecast errors follow a martingale diﬀerence sequence, so that any variable in the infor-
mation set of the forecaster has to be orthogonal to the forecast errors if the forecasts are
optimal. One can see that equations (2), (4), (5), and (6) assume quadratic loss and test
rationality by using variables from the forecaster’s information set (in this case the Federal
Reserve). In equation (6) vt is a vector that contains a constant, past forecast errors, and
other forecasts. When a researcher ﬁnds a signiﬁcant correlation between a variable in the
forecaster’s information set and the forecast error one of two things can be happening. The
ﬁrst is that the forecaster is using a symmetric loss function to obtain the forecasts, but
that she or he is not using the information in an eﬃcient way (i.e., the forecasts are not
optimal with respect to that particular variable). The second is that the forecaster is using
an asymmetric loss function to obtain the forecasts, and then the variable in the information
set has to be uncorrelated with a transformation of the error (i.e., the generalized error) but
can be correlated with the error. In the latter the forecasts would be rational.
The problem from an empirical perspective when traditional tests are used (like regres-
sions 1 to 6) is that the only information available to the researcher is the evidence of
correlation between the forecast error and the variable in the information set. With that
information it is diﬃcult for the researcher to distinguish between rejecting the hypothesis of
rationality because the forecasts are irrational or rejecting the hypothesis of symmetric loss
because the forecaster is actually using asymmetric loss. In formal terms, the researcher has
low power to distinguish what is driving the rejection, irrationality or asymmetric loss. The
argument is carefully explained in Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005). The results
presented in section 2 suggest that if the Federal Reserve has a symmetric loss function it is
not using available information eﬃciently. The alternative is that the information is being
used eﬃciently, but that the Federal Reserve has an asymmetric loss function.
The asymmetric loss used in this paper is the asymmetric quadratic loss, also called
quad-quad loss. In a forecasting context it is:
L(et+h,t,φ) =
h




19with 0 < φ < 1. φ is the asymmetry parameter: φ = 0.5 corresponds to symmetry, whereas
φ > 0.5 corresponds to under-prediction more costly than over-prediction and vice versa for
φ < 0.5. For instance, if φ = 0.8 under-predictions are approximately four times as costly
as over-predictions.40 An asymmetric quadratic loss is shown in Figure 4 for φ = 0.5 and
φ = 0.8.
Under asymmetric quadratic loss orthogonality condition (12) is (algebra in Appendix):
E [vt (et+h,t − (1 − 2φ)|et+h,t|)] = 0, (14)
for vt ⊂ Ωt. Expression (14) can be cast in a regression setting. This is useful to understand
what is the diﬀerence between a quadratic loss and an asymmetric quadratic loss. Start with
the following orthogonality condition:
E [vt (et+h,t − (1 − 2φ)|et+h,t| − v
0
tδ)] = 0. (15)
Equation (15) is satisﬁed if the forecasts are optimal, if they were produced using an asym-
metric quadratic loss function with parameter φ, if vt is in the information set of the producer
of the forecasts, and if δ = 0. Equation (15) is in the typical form of a GMM orthogonality
condition, and implies the following regression:
et+h,t = (1 − 2φ)|et+h,t| + v
0
tδ + εt+h, (16)
where it is clear that there is an omitted variable problem in equations (1) to (6) if the
producer of the forecasts is using an asymmetric quadratic loss with φ 6= 0.5. The omitted
variable is the absolute value of the errors. Under asymmetric quadratic loss the optimal
forecast is the φth expectile of inﬂation, which means that knowledge about the location
of the distribution is not enough to calculate the optimal forecast. To give an idea of
the role the absolute value of the errors is playing notice that under Gaussianity of the
forecast errors E [|et+h,t|] =
q
2
πvar(et+h,t), where var(et+h,t) is the variance of the error,
so the absolute value is a measure of the dispersion of the distribution. Under normality,
the asymmetric quadratic loss has the interpretation that the omitted variable and the
optimal bias depend on the degree of asymmetry (measured by φ) and the dispersion of the
distribution. With omitted variable bias in equations (1) to (6) both the estimated values
of the coeﬃcients (including the constant) and their associated standard errors are biased,
invalidating hypothesis testing.
40Appendix A contains a detailed derivation of the asymmetric quadratic loss, and an explanation of the
interpretation of the asymmetry parameter.
20To investigate if an asymmetric loss function is a possibility, the presence of the absolute
error under asymmetric quadratic suggests that a variable that measures the dispersion of
inﬂation can be used as a proxy for the omitted term. The Survey of Professional Forecasters
contains not only the consensus forecast, but information about the forecast of each of the
forecasters that answered the survey. The number of forecasters change with each survey,
but a measure of the dispersion of the forecasts has been used in the past as a measure of
the variance of inﬂation (Zarnowitz and Braun (1992)) and as a measure of heterogeneity in
inﬂation expectations (Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003)). For this paper the interquartile
range across forecasters is calculated, and the regression:
et+h,t = βinqrt+h,t + εt+h (17)
is estimated for each horizon using OLS and Newey-West standard errors. The sample used
is the post-Volcker sample. The results are presented in Table 7 using real-time data for
actual values of inﬂation. The results indicate that β is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
every horizon. Under the null hypothesis of symmetric loss and rationality, a test of β = 0
is testing if information about the dispersion of the forecasts is in the Fed’s information set
when producing the forecasts given that the Fed uses a symmetric loss. The evidence rejects
this hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is either that the Fed has symmetric loss but that
it is not using information contained in the spread of forecasts from SPF, something that
points again to the Fed’s irrationality, or that the Fed has and asymmetric loss, and that the
spread across forecasters is working as a proxy for the omitted variable in the regression.41
If one believes that information in the spread of the forecasters from the SPF is part of
the Federal Reserve’s information set, then the results in Table 7 support the hypothesis
that the Federal Reserve has an asymmetric loss. If this is the case, the estimate of β is
an estimate of φ (compare equations (16) and (17) under the null of asymmetric loss and
rationality), and an estimate of the asymmetry parameter can be recuperated. If one takes
the value of (1 − 2φ) = −0.52, the estimated value for horizon four, then the estimated
asymmetry parameter is 0.76, which implies that for the Federal Reserve since Volcker took
oﬃce and until the second quarter of 1998 under-prediction was between three and four times
as costly as over-prediction. This estimate is preliminary because it is obtained under the
assumption that the interquartile range is in the Fed’s information set and that it is used
eﬃciently by the Fed, something that has to be tested, not assumed.
41This does not imply that the interquartile range is a measure of the conditional variance of inﬂation,
but rather than, in the absence of that variable, it captures some of its correlation with the forecasts errors.
213.2.3 GMM Estimation and Tests for Symmetry
The orthogonality condition (14) can be used to estimate the asymmetry parameter φ using
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) developed by Hansen (1982). For a consis-
tent estimate of the asymmetry parameter only one instrument is needed because only one
parameter has to be estimated. To guarantee that the variable used as instrument is in
the Fed’s information set a constant can be used as the instrument. If this is the case, the
orthogonality condition is:
E [(et+h,t − (1 − 2φ)|et+h,t|)] = 0. (18)
The intuition behind the estimation is simple. If the sample average of the errors is zero, then
the estimate of φ would not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.5, as the sample counterpart of
orthogonality condition (18) would be satisﬁed only if φ = 0.5. If the sample average of the
errors is not zero (i.e., if there is a bias), the value of φ is adjusted until the sample coun-
terpart of the orthogonality condition is satisﬁed. Therefore the estimate of the asymmetry
parameter is obtained by asking the question: What degree of asymmetry rationalizes the
observed bias?
This method of estimation was originally proposed by Elliott, Komunjer and Timmer-
mann (2005, 2006) using an instrumental variables estimator. They show the conditions
under which the asymmetry parameter is identiﬁed for the case of an asymmetric quadratic
loss function. The implication from what they ﬁnd is that the most important assumption
needed for identiﬁcation is that the optimal parameter of the model used to produce the
forecasts has to be inside the parameter space, so that the FOC used to derive the orthog-
onality condition is useful for ﬁnding the minimum. The assumption about the parameter
being inside the parameter space guarantees that the FOC is necessary for the minimum, the
fact that the loss function is convex indicates that the FOC is suﬃcient for the minimum.42
Because orthogonality condition (14) must hold for every horizon (h = 0 to h = 4), there
are two ways to estimate the asymmetry parameter. One is to estimate one parameter for
each horizon. The other is to use all the horizons in a system. The latter has the advantage
of using the fact that the residuals in each of the implied regressions are correlated, giving a
more eﬃcient estimation. If the second strategy is used, one can further test the restriction
that the asymmetry parameter is the same for all horizons. For this paper the second strategy
is followed, and the results reported here include the restriction that the loss function is
42There are other technical conditions that have to be satisﬁed. The stochastic process of inﬂation has to
be such that the expectations used in the orthogonality conditions exist, that at least two moments exist, and
that there is not too much heterogeneity (Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann, 2005). This paper assumes
that this conditions are satisﬁed.
22the same for all horizons (as well as tests of this restriction).43 To clarify the estimation
process, let et=[et,t − (1 − 2φ)|et,t|,...,et+h,t − (1 − 2φ)|et+h,t|]
0 be the ((h + 1) × 1) vector
containing the generalized errors. Notice the restriction that φ is the same for all horizons.
With a constant as an instrument, vt = 1, the sample counterpart of the orthogonality







where T is the sample size. The GMM estimator b φT is the value of φ that minimizes the
scalar QT = [g0
TWTgT] where WT is a positive deﬁnite weighting matrix which may be a
function of the data. For all the estimations presented on the rest of the paper the inverse
of the Newey-West (1987) estimate of the asymptotic variance of the sample mean of et ⊗vt
is used as the weighting matrix.
The estimation is done ﬁrst for the post-Volcker sample using real-time data. The sam-
ple used is from the third quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 1998 giving a total of 76
observations for each equation in the system.44 The results of the estimation imply that the
asymmetry parameter is b φ = 0.80, with a standard error of 0.05, so that it is clearly statis-
tically diﬀerent from 0.5. A p-value of 0.56 for the Wald test indicates that the restriction of
the loss function being the same across horizons cannot be rejected.
The degree of asymmetry of the Federal Reserve is estimated to be around 0.8, which
implies that, between the third quarter of 1979 and the second of 1998, the Federal Reserve
under-predictions of inﬂation were approximately four times as costly as over-predictions.
This estimate also implies that for the Federal Reserve inﬂation above the implicit inﬂation
target is four times as costly than inﬂation below the target. Figure 4 plots the asymmetric
loss implied by this estimate (φ = 0.8) and compares it to the quadratic loss typically
assumed in the literature (φ = 0.5).
The technique can also be applied to the pre-Volcker sample. The problem is that the
number of observations is 16 if all the horizons are used. If only horizons one and two are used,
then 41 observations are available. With such a small number of observations the estimates
are likely to be severely biased. Further, information about the longer horizons has to be
thrown away, which casts further doubts on the estimates. The result with 41 observations
43Estimation horizon by horizon was also done but is not reported. The results reported in the paper are
a good summary of the results found horizon by horizon. The only detail that is worth mentioning is that
the estimate of the asymmetry parameter has a slight tendency to increase with the forecast horizon.
44Horizon zero is not used. The coeﬃcient associated with this horizon was diﬀerent than the coeﬃcients
associated with the other horizons (i.e., the Wald test of equality of coeﬃcients rejected the null when horizon
zero was included).
23and using real-time data for inﬂation is that b φ = 0.25 with a standard error of 0.11. The
estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.5. This result implies that for the pre-Volcker Federal
Reserve, under-predictions are approximately one third as costly as over-predictions. The
asymmetry turns over, which implies that for the Federal Reserve pre-Volcker inﬂation below
the target was about three times more costly than inﬂation above the target. The restriction
that the loss function is the same across horizons cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.50).
A Wald test was used to investigate if there is a change (in the sample pre-Volcker) of
the estimates of the asymmetry parameter before and after the break of 1974-1975. The
statistic is 0.46. A chi-square with one degree of freedom gives a p-value of 0.49. There is no
strong evidence against the conclusion that the asymmetry parameter can be considered to
be the same for the entire sample pre-Volcker despite the ﬁrst break. The interpretation is
that the ﬁrst break was not caused by a change in Fed’s preferences about inﬂation.
3.3 Testing Rationality Allowing for Asymmetric Costs
The evidence presented in section 2 points toward irrationality of the Federal Reserve inﬂa-
tion forecasts if symmetric loss is assumed. But the results so far in section 3 show that the
evidence can be rationalized by an asymmetric loss function. The rest of this section tests
the rationality of inﬂation forecasts allowing for asymmetric costs by using over-identiﬁcation
tests.
The orthogonality condition (14) is satisﬁed for every vt ⊂ Ωt. Only one parameter has
to be estimated, so that if vt is a vector, then one of the variables can be used to estimate
the asymmetry parameter and the others can be used to test if the orthogonality condition
holds for them, conditioning on the estimated value of the asymmetry parameter. In a
GMM framework this can be done using Hansen’s test ( J-test) of overidentifying restrictions
(Hansen (1982)) with the advantage that GMM uses all the instruments for estimation and
testing. For estimation, it does this by searching for the value of φ that makes a linear
combination of the sample counterparts of each orthogonality condition (from each element
in the vector vt) as close as possible to zero. Conditional on the estimated value of φ, a
J-test tests if the linear combination is close enough to zero so as to believe that each of
the orthogonality conditions is close enough to be satisﬁed in population. To clarify, let the
dimension of vt be k × 1. Then the sample counterpart of the orthogonality conditions can






et ⊗ vt, (20)
24where T is the sample size. The GMM estimator b φT is the value of φ that minimizes the
scalar QT = [g0
TWTgT]. Hansen’s J test statistic is TQT and it converges in distribution to a
χ2
(h+1)k−1. As before, the orthogonality conditions for all horizons are used in a system with
the restriction that the asymmetry parameter is the same for all horizons.
For the post-Volcker sample, the bottom panel of Table 8 presents the results using real-
time data and a constant and one extra variable as instruments. The instruments are the
variables used before in the paper: errors lagged h + 1 periods, the SPF consensus forecast,
and the SPF interquartile range across forecasters. The results indicate that, given the
estimated asymmetry parameter (which is between 0.8 and 0.9 and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0.5), Hansen’s test cannot reject rationality. Thus the evidence supports a Federal Reserve
that used an asymmetric loss to produce its forecasts and that, once these asymmetries
are taken into account, eﬃciently used all the information contained in the instruments.
Results with revised data (not reported) lead to the same conclusion, but with an estimated
asymmetry parameter around 0.9.
One possible concern is that of weak instruments. In this context weak instruments refers
to weak identiﬁcation. Weak identiﬁcation occurs if E [et ⊗ vt] is close to zero for φ 6= φ0,
where φ0 denotes the parameter used to produce the optimal forecasts. According to Stock,
Wright and Yogo (2002) if identiﬁcation is weak then GMM estimates can be sensitive to the
addition of instruments, so that if this occurs in an empirical application it can be indicative
of weak identiﬁcation. As can be seen in Table 8 the estimates do not change much when
diﬀerent instruments are used, which can be considered evidence of strong identiﬁcation.
If this is true it also implies that the tests for symmetry and rationality have good power
(relative to the case of weak identiﬁcation). Another evidence that the instruments are not
weak is that the preliminary estimates of the asymmetry parameter obtained from the use
of the spread across forecasters (equation (17)) are also similar to the estimates shown in
Table 8. Notice that equation (17) does not include a constant, so that power is not being
obtained simply by the presence of it.
Another possible concern could be that the explanation oﬀered here may be explaining
too much, in the sense that rationality cannot be rejected. This amounts as to say that the
overidentiﬁcation tests have no power against the alternative hypothesis of irrationality. To
investigate this possibility, Capistr´ an (2005) contains a Monte Carlo experiment in which
the same method is able to correctly reject rationality once asymmetric loss is allowed for.
Rationality for the pre-Volcker sample is also tested. But the power of the tests is seriously
undermined because the number of observations is very small, so these results have to be
taken with less conﬁdence. The results using real-time data are presented in the upper panel
of Table 8. They indicate that once asymmetric costs are taken into account the forecasts are
25rational. The estimates of the asymmetry parameter with diﬀerent instruments are between
0.16 and 0.25. Results with revised data (not reported) lead to the same conclusion, but
with an asymmetry parameter between 0.19 and 0.32.
The Wald tests that appear in Table 8 test the restriction that the loss function is the
same across horizons. There is no strong evidence against the loss function being the same
across horizons.
4 Implications and Alternative Explanations
4.1 Implications of Asymmetric Loss
The explanation given in this paper for the evidence about the Federal Reserve’s apparent ir-
rationality is that the Fed has an asymmetric loss function over inﬂation forecast errors. This
explanation has some implications for the normative loss function typically postulated for
the Federal Reserve, for the way inﬂation behaves in equilibrium, and for the use researches
can give to the Green Book forecasts of inﬂation.
The Federal Reserve is directed by law to promote maximum employment and stable
prices, and for this reason its loss function is typically modelled as a function of inﬂation
deviations from a target and deviations of output from potential. In contrast, in this paper
we have used a loss function that omits the output component. This loss is meant as a
reduced form of the former, and the implication of the ﬁnding of asymmetry is that only
functions that can be mapped into asymmetric losses over inﬂation are consistent with the
data. Examples may be functions that are symmetric but not quadratic, such as the one
proposed by Orphanides and Wieland (2000) that considers “inﬂation zone targeting”, or
functions that include precautionary terms, such as the one considered by Cukierman and
Gerlach (2003) that considers a function where the Fed is more concerned about downward
deviations of output from its potential than about upward deviations.
The second implication of asymmetric loss is that equilibrium inﬂation will not be on
target (on average) as there exists an optimal bias induced by the asymmetric costs. Ruge-
Murcia (2003) shows that in a model with an asymmetric loss function around an inﬂation
target certainty equivalence no longer holds and therefore the expected marginal loss is
nonlinear in the control error. The implication is that inﬂation can be on average below
or above the target (a bias with respect to the target exists) depending on the type of
asymmetry (the sign of φ). If inﬂation above the target is more costly for the central bank
than inﬂation below the target (the case of the Federal Reserve since Volcker until the end of
the sample in 1998) the fear of having inﬂation above the target will induce the central bank
26to maintain inﬂation below it. In the model this is reﬂected in the fact that an asymmetric
central bank has a higher interest rate (everything else equal) than a symmetric central
bank, because the asymmetric bank is setting the expected value of inﬂation to be below the
target. Nobay and Peel (2003) named this phenomena deﬂationary bias. The reverse would
be true for a central bank with preferences such as those estimated here for the pre-Volcker
Fed.
The third implication of asymmetric loss is that higher moments of inﬂation, such as
the variance, enter the process for the mean of inﬂation in equilibrium. In the model under
asymmetric loss, equilibrium inﬂation will follow a GARCH-in-mean process induced by
the central bank’s choice of monetary policy. If the assumption about scale-location of ε
is relaxed, then other moments are likely to be important. In the case of an asymmetric
quadratic loss function one would expect the φth expectile to matter for equilibrium inﬂation.
The fourth implication of asymmetric loss is not for the economy but for researchers
working with Green Book inﬂation forecasts. If the Green Book forecasts were produced
under a quadratic loss they would be the Fed’s expected value of inﬂation given its infor-
mation set. But if they are produced, as it seems to be the case, by using an asymmetric
loss function then they are not the expected value of inﬂation, but the expected value plus
a bias term. To obtain the expectation one has to correct or de-bias the forecasts. From
the results presented so far one can calculate an average factor that is useful as a rule-of-
thumb to correct the forecasts. For the Volcker-Greenspan sample, from the third quarter
of 1979 to the second of 1998, the factor that seems appropriate is −0.5 for real-time data
and −0.6 for fully revised data.45 For example, if a Green Book forecast predicts inﬂation
to be 3.0% four-quarters-ahead, then a good proxy for the Fed’s expected value of inﬂation
four-quarters-ahead is 2.5%.46
Finally, once asymmetric costs have being taken into account the implication of rationality
is that the Fed can be modelled as having rational expectations, and that the actions taken
by the Fed, even pre-Volcker, were optimal given their preferences and information.
4.2 Alternative Explanations
Other theories have being put forward to explain some of the empirical ﬁndings documented
in this paper.
The ﬁrst is that the Green Book forecasts are not forecasts but projections based on
45The factors are obtained from the estimated constants in Tables 5 and 6.
46The bias depends on moments higher than the mean, and in the case of inﬂation these moments are
likely to be time-varying (e.g., the variance), so the bias is likely to be time-varying. A more formal method
to de-bias the forecasts has to take this time-varying component into account.
27an assumed instrument path, and that most of the time the assumed path was one of no-
change. Even if this were the case, this cannot account for the almost twenty year bias from
the third quarter of 1979 until the end of the sample. If the forecasts were always assuming a
no-change path for the instrument, then they will have over-predicted inﬂation when policy
was tightened, and under-predicted when policy was loosened. But the path was not always
assumed constant. Indeed, Reifschneider et al. (1997) report that, although the point of
departure for the Fed staﬀ most often is an assumption that the instrument, the federal
funds rate, will remain unchanged over the forecast horizon, if the unchanged instrument
path assumption is “at odds with the stated objectives of most policymakers”then another
path is assumed. Furthermore, Reifschneider et al. (1997) also report that the forecasts
are judgemental and that the forecasting process involve several intercept corrections by
members of the staﬀ, so that the possibility exists that even if the forecasts coming out from
the model were based on a constant path, the forecasts that appeared in the Green Book
may have been closer to forecasts that reﬂected the most likely path for the instrument.
Another argument to explain the bias in inﬂation forecasts is based on the Phillips curve
theory and under- or over-estimation of the NAIRU (Nonnaccelerating inﬂation rate of un-
employment). Primiceri (2006) and Orphanides (2002) document under-estimation of the
NAIRU during the sixties and seventies. Meyer (2004) writes about over-estimation of the
NAIRU during the nineties. He relates that during the nineties the increase in productivity
in the United States caused a decline of the NAIRU, but that the data was slow in showing
the change in productivity, and therefore the Federal Reserve was expecting inﬂation to rise
due to the low unemployment (though to be below the NAIRU) but that the rise never
happened. This explanation certainly can be used to explain part of the bias, but the result
documented in this paper is too systematic to be explained by an error in the estimation of
the NAIRU. If the Fed does not like to over-predict inﬂation, then simply looking at past
errors is enough to give a factor that corrects the bias.
A related argument is that of learning. In this case the forecasts would appear irrational
while the Fed learns about a key aspect of the economy, for example the persistence of
inﬂation (Primiceri, 2006). But this argument cannot explain the sudden change in the
sign of the bias in 1979 nor can it account for the duration of it (20 years in the sample
since Volcker). A simple OLS learning mechanism is helpful to explain why. Suppose the
parameter that is not know is the mean of inﬂation. At each point in time the Fed would
estimate the mean with the available observations. If the ﬁrst observation is far above the
true mean of inﬂation and if the forecast of inﬂation is just the mean then the forecast would
over-predict inﬂation for a while, but eventually the estimate will converge to the true value
and the bias would disappear.
28As another explanation one can think of a reversion to the mean mechanism. This
because apparently inﬂation was under-predicted when its level was high (the seventies) and
over-predicted when its level was low (the nineties). In this case a symmetric loss function
that depends not only on the forecast error but also on the level of inﬂation could be used to
model Federal Reserve’s preferences. But closer inspection of Figures 5 and 6 reveals that the
period from 1979 to 1983 had an inﬂation level above 5% and a systematic over-prediction
of inﬂation, invalidating the use of a level-dependent loss function as a way to model Federal
Reserve’s preferences. However, there are other reasons to believe that a loss function that
is asymmetric and depends on the level of inﬂation may be useful. This is because for a
cautious central bank inﬂation below the target could become more costly if the level of
inﬂation is close to zero (deﬂation scare), as in this case the main instrument of monetary
policy is at risk of being rendered useless. In this context, a cautious central bank may
have an asymmetry against low inﬂation when inﬂation is close to zero, but an asymmetry
against high inﬂation when inﬂation is safely above zero. This paper does not employ a level
dependent loss because deﬂation scares did not occur during the sample period.
In a similar vein, it could be that the Federal Reserve was indeed irrational an produced
its forecast using adaptive expectations. If this was the case, the forecasts would have
under-predicted inﬂation when inﬂation had an increasing trend (as before Volcker) and
would have over-predicted it when inﬂation had a decreasing trend (as was the case since
Volcker until about 1998). The data appears to be consistent with this explanation (Figure
6). In addition, Reifschneider et al. (1997) indicate that at least up to 1997 the models
used to support the forecasting process at the Board of Governors indeed used adaptive
expectations.47 The problem with this explanation is that it implies that the Fed did not
systematically evaluated its own inﬂation forecasts errors. Hanson and Whitehorn (2006)
explore this alternative explanation in detail.
Finally, another possible explanation is that since private forecast errors show a pattern of
bias similar to that of the Fed’s forecasts, the bias can not be related to individual incentives
but has to be explained by systemic factors. However, although it is true that the mean
across forecasters shows a similar pattern of bias, this is not true for individual forecasters.
Capistr´ an and Timmermann (2006) analyze individual forecasters from the SPF since 1968
and show that there are forecasters that systematically over-predict inﬂation and forecasters
that systematically under-predict it.
47Two diﬀerent models were used as reference models during the sample, the MPS from the late 1960s
until the beginning of 1996 and the FRB/US model from mid-1996 onwards.
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This paper documents two facts about Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts. The ﬁrst is that
there was a systematic under-prediction of inﬂation during the sixties and the seventies and
a systematic over-prediction of inﬂation during the eighties and nineties. This change in
behavior coincides with Volcker’s appointment as Chairman in 1979. The second is that
under quadratic loss the Federal Reserve was not eﬃciently using information contained in
the consensus forecast of inﬂation and in the dispersion across forecasters from the SPF.
The immediate conclusion derived from these facts would be, if one is willing to sustain
symmetric loss, that the Federal Reserve was not using information eﬃciently to forecast
inﬂation and, therefore, to take monetary policy decisions. But this paper presents evidence
to support the alternative explanation that the Federal Reserve had asymmetric costs of
under- and over-prediction and that, when allowance is made for these costs, it seems to
have used information eﬃciently.
Thus, the Federal Reserve inﬂation forecasts analyzed here seem to be rational and to
incorporate the information contained in forecasts from the SPF, as Romer and Romer (2000)
pointed out, but only if asymmetries in the loss function are taken into account. The Federal
Reserve appears to have been cautious about inﬂation since Volcker and until the second
quarter of 1998, and appears to have been less worried about it before him.
The estimated degree of asymmetry is high, but so is the bias found in the forecasts.
The empirical results indicate that the size of the bias in the sample since Volcker (the
results more conﬁdently estimated) is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s seeing inﬂation
above an implicit target as four times more costly than inﬂation below it. Further research,
perhaps using structural models, is needed to investigate to what extent the Federal Reserve
of this period was overly cautious. To further reveal what its forecasts tell about the Federal
Reserve, future research should incorporate output in the loss function and evaluate other
Green Book forecasts.
30References
[1] Andrews, Donald W.K. “Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance
Matrix Estimation.” Econometrica, 1991, 59, pp. 817-858.
[2] Bai, Jushan. “Estimation of a Change Point in Multiple Regression Models.” The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 1997, 79, pp. 551-563.
[3] Bai, Jushan and Pierre Perron. “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple
Structural Changes.” Econometrica, 1998, 66, pp. 47-78.
[4] Bai, Jushan and Pierre Perron. “Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural
Change Models.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2003, 18, pp. 1-22.
[5] Bernanke, Ben S. and Michael Woodford. “Inﬂation Forecasts and Monetary Policy.”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997, 24, pp. 653-684.
[6] Blinder, Alan S. Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.
[7] Capistr´ an, Carlos. “Bias in Federal Reserve Inﬂation Forecasts: Is the Federal Reserve
Irrational or Just Cautious?” UCSD Discussion Paper: 2005-05.
[8] Capistr´ an, Carlos and Allan Timmermann. “Disagreement and Biases in Inﬂation Ex-
pectations.” Banco de M´ exico Working Paper: 2006-07.
[9] Cavanagh, Christopher L., Graham Elliott and James H. Stock. “Inference in Models
with Nearly Nonstationary Regressors.” Econometric Theory, 1995, 11, pp. 1131-1141.
[10] Chong, Yock Y. and David F. Hendry. “Econometric Evaluation of Linear Macro-
economic Models.” Review of Economic Studies, 1986, 53, pp. 671-690.
[11] Chow, Gregory C. “Test of Equality Between Sets of Coeﬃcients in Two Linear Regres-
sions.” Econometrica, 1960, 28, pp. 591-605.
[12] Christoﬀersen, Peter F. and Francis X. Diebold. “Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric
Loss.” Econometric Theory, 1997, 13, pp. 808-817.
[13] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal´ ı and Mark Gertler. “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeco-
nomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Febru-
ary, 2000, pp. 147-180.
[14] Croushore, Dean. “Introducing: The Survey of Professional Forecasters.” Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, November/December, 1993, pp. 3-13.
[15] Croushore, Dean and Thomas Stark.“Forecasting with a Real-Time Data Set for
Macroeconomists.” Journal of Macroeconomics, 2002, 24, pp. 507-531.
[16] Cukierman, Alex and Stefan Gerlach.“The Inﬂation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some
Evidence.” The Manchester School, 2003, 71, pp. 541-565.
31[17] Elliott, Graham, Ivana Komunjer and Allan Timmermann. “Biases in Macroeconomic
Forecasts: Irrationality or Asymmetric Loss?” Manuscript, UCSD, 2006.
[18] Elliott, Graham, Ivana Komunjer and Allan Timmermann. “Estimation and Testing of
Forecast Rationality under Flexible Loss.” The Review of Economics Studies., 2005, 72,
pp. 1107-1125.
[19] Ehrbeck, T. and R. Waldmann. “Why are professional forecasters biased? agency versus
behavioral explanations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, 111, pp. 21-40.
[20] Fair, Ray C. and Robert J. Shiller. “The Informational Content of Ex Ante Forecasts.”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1989, 71, pp. 325–331.
[21] Granger, Clive W.J. “Prediction with a Generalized Cost Function.” Operational Re-
search, 1969, 20, pp. 199-207.
[22] Granger, Clive W.J. “Outline of Forecast Theory using Generalized Cost Functions.”
Spanish Economic Review, 1999, 1, pp. 161-173.
[23] Granger, Clive W.J. and Paul Newbold. Forecasting Economic Time Series. 2nd Edition.
New York: Academic Press. 1986.
[24] Granger, Clive W.J. and Hashem M. Pesaran. “Economic and Statistical Measures of
Forecast Accuracy.” Journal of Forecasting, 2000, 19, pp. 537-560.
[25] Granger, Clive W.J. and Ramu Ramanathan. “Improved Methods of Combining Fore-
casts.” Journal of Forecasting, 1984, 3, pp. 197-204.
[26] G¨ urkaynak, Refet S., Bryan Sack and Eric Swanson. “The Sensitivity of Long-Term In-
terest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models.”
American Economic Review, 2005, 95, pp. 425-436.
[27] Hansen, Lars P. “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estima-
tors.” Econometrica, 1982, 50, pp. 1029-1054.
[28] Hanson, Michael S. and Jayson Whitehorn. “Reconsidering the Optimality of Federal
Reserve Forecasts.” Manuscript, Wesleyan University, 2006.
[29] Keane, Michael P. and David E. Runkle. “Testing the Rationality of Price Forecasts:
New Evidence From Panel Data.” American Economic Review, 1990, 80, pp. 714-735.
[30] Laster, D., P. Bennett and I.S. Geoum. “Rational Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114, pp. 293-318.
[31] Leitch, Gordon and J. Ernest Tanner. “Economic Forecast Evaluation: Proﬁts versus
the Conventional Error Measures.” American Economic Review, 1991, 81, pp. 580-590.
[32] Mankiw, Gregory N., Ricardo Reis and Justin Wolfers. “Disagreement about Inﬂation
Expectations.” in: M.Gertler and K. Rogoﬀ (eds.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003.
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2003.
32[33] Meyer, Laurence. A Term at the Fed: An Insider’s View. New York: HarperBusiness.
2004.
[34] Mincer, Jacob and Victor Zarnowitz. “The Evaluation of Economic Forecasts.” in: J.
Mincer (ed.) Economic Forecasts and Expectations. New York: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. 1969.
[35] Mishkin, Frederic S. “Are Market Forecasts Rational?” American Economic Review,
1981, 71, pp. 295-306.
[36] Newey, Withney and Kenneth West. “A Simple Positive Semi-deﬁnite, Heteroskedas-
ticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.” Econometrica, 1987, 55, pp.
703-708.
[37] Nobay, Robert A. and David A. Peel.“Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a
Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences.” The Economic Journal, 2003, 113,
pp. 657-665.
[38] Orphanides, Athanasios. “Monetary Policy Rules and the Great Inﬂation.” American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2002, 92, pp. 115-120.
[39] Orphanides, Athanasios and V. Wieland. “Inﬂation Zone Targeting.” European Eco-
nomic Review, 2000, 44, pp. 1351-1387.
[40] Ottaviani, M and P.N. Sorensen. “The Strategy of Professional Forecasting.” Journal
of Financial Economics, 2006, 81, pp. 441-466.
[41] Patton, Andrew and Allan Timmermann.“Properties of Optimal Forecasts under Asym-
metric Loss and Nonlinearity.” Forthcoming in the Journal of Econometrics.
[42] Primiceri, Giorgio E. “Why Inﬂation Rose and Fell: Policymaker’s Beliefs and US Post-
war Stabilization Policy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006, 1221, pp. 867-902.
[43] Reifschneider, David, L., Savid, J. Stockton and David W. Wilcox. “Econometric Models
and the Monetary Policy Process.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, 1997, 47, pp. 1-37.
[44] Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer. “Federal Reserve Information and the Be-
havior of Interest Rates.” American Economic Review, 2000, 90, pp. 429-457.
[45] Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer. “Choosing the Federal Reserve Chair:
Lessons from History.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004, 18, pp. 129-162.
[46] Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J. “Uncovering Financial Markets’ Beliefs about Inﬂation Tar-
gets.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 1999, 15, pp. 483-512.
[47] Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J. “Inﬂation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences.” Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2003, 35, pp. 763-785.
33[48] Sims, Christopher A. “The Role of Models and Probabilities in the Monetary Policy
Process.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2002, 2, pp. 1-62.
[49] Stock, James H., James H. Wright and Motohiro Yogo. “A Survey of Weak Instruments
and Weak Identiﬁcation in Generalized Method of Moments.” Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, 2002, 20, pp. 518-529.
[50] Svensson, Lars E.O. “Inﬂation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inﬂa-
tion Targets.” European Economic Review, 1997, 41, pp. 1111-1146.
[51] Weber, E.U. “From Subjective Probabilities to decision weights: The Eﬀect of Asym-
metric Loss functions on the Evaluation of Uncertain Outcomes and Events.” Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 1994, 115, pp. 228-242.
[52] Zarnowitz, Victor and Phillip Braun. “Twenty-two Years of the NBER-ASA Quarterly
Economic Outlook Surveys: Aspects and Comparisons of Forecasting Performance.”
NBER working paper 3965, 1992.
[53] Zellner, Arnold. “Biased Predictors, Rationality and the Evaluation of Forecasts.” Eco-
nomics Letters, 1986, 21, pp. 45-48.
34Appendix A. Mathematical Derivations












where a,b > 0. If L(et+h,t) = |et+h,t|
p then this is the family of asymmetric functions deﬁned
in Elliott, Komunjer, and Timmermann (2005, 2006). With p = 2, this is the asymmetric
quadratic loss, with a giving the weight attached to positive errors (under-prediction) and b
giving the weight attached to negative errors (over-prediction). a = b gives symmetry in the
sense that errors of the same magnitude but diﬀerent signs receive the same weight. The
loss is not diﬀerentiable at zero, but it is continuous.
Deﬁne the asymmetry parameter as φ = a
a+b, so that 0 < φ < 1. Then the asymmetric
quadratic loss function can be written as:
L(et+h,t) = (a + b)
h




where 1(et+h,t<0) is the indicator function that equals one if the error is negative and zero if
it is positive. This loss function is homogeneous, so that the ﬁrst factor (a+b) is just a scale
factor and can be normalized to one. This normalization gives equation (13).
The interpretation of the asymmetry parameter is as follows: φ = 0.5 gives a = b so




example, if φ = 0.8 , then a
b = 4, so that positive errors are weighted four times more than
negative ones (are four time as costly).




using the asymmetric quadratic loss. The ﬁrst order condition (necessary and suﬃcient due













where the asterisk, ∗, denotes optimality. The loss function is not diﬀerentiable at zero, but
because of the continuity of the function the derivative can be taken using “Dirac” Delta δ.
Provided that integral and diﬀerentiation operators can be interchanged (which is assumed





































































The last expression indicates that the optimal forecast is the φth expectile of the expected
distribution of the variable of interest given the information set.













Expression (14) is the same as this last expression, except that the following algebraic change





|et+h,t| = 2φ|et+h,t| − (2)1(et+h,t<0) |et+h,t|
= 2φ|et+h,t| − [|et+h,t| − et+h,t]
= (2φ − 1)|et+h,t| + et+h,t
= et+h,t − (1 − 2φ)|et+h,t|.
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Table 1: Rationality Tests for Federal Reserve Inﬂation Forecasts Under






Forecast horizon α γ ωC p-value Sample Na
0 -0.08 0.23** 0.21* 0.00 68:4–98:2 119
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
1 -0.07 0.22* -0.20 0.07 69:1–98:2 118
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19)
2 -0.01 0.37** -0.12 0.04 69:3–98:2 116
(0.17) (0.18) (0.27)
3 -0.32* 0.11 -0.03 0.01 74:3–98:2 96
(0.17) (0.10) (0.15)
4 -0.22 0.07 -0.37** 0.01 75:3–98:2 92
(0.21) (0.12) (0.17)
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Notes: eF is the forecast error from Green Book forecasts of inﬂation, eC is the forecast
error from the median of SPF forecasts. The actual value of inﬂation is taken from the
second revision available from the real-time database. t and h index the date and horizon
respectively. OLS estimates. In parentheses robust standard errors using Newey-West with
h lags. The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the three parameters associated
with the coeﬃcients are equal to zero (Wald test with three df).
a After adjusting endpoints.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
Table 2: Rationality Tests for Federal Reserve Inﬂation Forecasts Under
Quadratic Loss Using Revised Data. Equation as in Table 1
Forecast horizon α γ ωC p-value Sample Na
0 -0.10 0.16* 0.35** 0.00 68:4–98:2 119
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
1 -0.08 0.38** -0.03 0.00 69:1–98:2 118
(0.11) (0.10) (0.18)
2 -0.05 0.44** -0.05 0.00 69:3–98:2 116
(0.15) (0.17) (0.19)
3 -0.40** 0.21** 0.04 0.00 74:3–98:2 96
(0.16) (0.09) (0.16)
4 -0.36 0.10 -0.27 0.00 75:3–98:2 92
(0.23) (0.15) (0.18)
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Notes: As in Table 1, except that the actual value of inﬂation is taken from the last vintage
available from the real-time database as of May 2004.
a After adjusting endpoints.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
37Table 3: Tests for Multiple Structural Changes in the Mean of Federal Reserve
Inﬂation Forecast Errors Using Real-time Data
Forecast horizon Speciﬁcations Tests
Sample N UDmax SupF(2/1)
0 66:1 98:2 130 7.79* 3.64
1 68:3 98.2 120 5.90 1.08
2 68:4 98:2 119 5.04 1.83
3 73:3 98:2 100 5.59 4.14
4 74:2 98:2 97 8.68* 7.01
Numbers of Breaks Selected Estimates with Two Breaks
BIC Sequential T1 T2
0 1 1 75:1 82:4
1 1 0 74:3 79:2
2 1 0 74:2 79:4
3 1 0 79:3 86:1
4 2 1 79:3 85:4
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The program used is available
from Professor Perron’s web page: http://econ.bu.edu/perron/code.html
Notes: The supF tests and sequential selection of the number of breaks are constructed using
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrices using a quadratic kernel
with automatic bandwidth selection following Andrews (1991). A size of 10% is used for the
sequential tests.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
Table 4: Tests for Multiple Structural Changes in the Mean of Federal Reserve
Inﬂation Forecast Errors Using Revised Data
Forecast horizon Speciﬁcations Tests
Sample N UDmax SupF(2/1)
0 66:1 98:2 130 58.02** 2.05
1 68:3 98.2 120 45.67** 4.32
2 68:4 98:2 119 22.76* 7.78*
3 73:3 98:2 100 8.29* 1.42
4 74:2 98:2 97 28.46** 7.65*
Numbers of Breaks Selected Estimates with Two Breaks
BIC Sequential T1 T2
0 1 1 75:1 80:3
1 2 1 74:3 79:2
2 2 1 74:3 79:1
3 1 1 80:2 85:4
4 2 1 80:1 85:4
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The program used is available
from Professor Perron’s web page: http://econ.bu.edu/perron/code.html
Notes: As in Table 3 except that the actual value of inﬂation is taken from the last vintage
available from the real-time database as of May 2004.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
38Table 5: Rationality Tests for Federal Reserve Inﬂation Forecasts Under
Quadratic Loss Using Real-time Data and Subsamples. Equation is:
eF




Forecast horizon α γ ωC p-value Sample Na
Pre–1975
0 0.34* 0.41** -0.02 0.06 68:4–74:4 25
(0.21) (0.20) (0.18)
1 0.72* 0.30 -0.30 0.00 69:1–74:4 24
(0.42) (0.22) (0.47)
2 0.68 0.18 -1.19 0.00 69:3–74:4 22
(0.57) (0.43) (0.79)
1975–1979
0 -0.29 -0.12 0.28 0.48 75:1–79:2 18
(0.27) (0.15) (0.41)
1 -0.05 -0.03 -0.14 0.97 75:1–79:2 18
(0.41) (0.17) (0.49)
2 0.42 0.13 0.91** 0.02 75:1–79:2 18
(0.43) (0.13) (0.42)
3 0.43 0.14 -0.42 0.27 75:1–79:2 18
(0.39) (0.12) (0.70)
4 0.89** 0.09 -0.46 0.00 75:3–79:2 16
(0.42) (0.07) (0.56)
Post–1979
0 -0.31** 0.01 0.51** 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10)
1 -0.53** -0.15 0.26** 0.00 79:3–98:3 76
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
2 -0.45** 0.11 0.11 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
3 -0.52** 0.07 0.09 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
4 -0.56** -0.02 -0.19 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.19) (0.12) (0.20)
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Notes: As in Table 1.
a After adjusting endpoints.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
39Table 6: Rationality Tests for Federal Reserve Inﬂation Forecasts Un-
der Quadratic Loss Using Revised Data and Subsamples. Equation is:
eF




Forecast horizon α γ ωC p-value Sample Na
Pre–1975
0 1.01** -0.24 0.17 0.00 68:4–74:4 25
(0.19) (0.15) (0.12)
1 1.70** -0.17* 0.05 0.00 69:1–74:4 24
(0.32) (0.10) (0.29)
2 1.72** 0.00 -0.09 0.00 69:3–74:4 22
(0.6 ) (0.39) (0.54)
1975–1979
0 0.05 -0.37** 0.53* 0.01 75:1–79:2 18
(0.25) (0.17) (0.29)
1 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.72 75:1–79:2 18
(0.28) (0.21) (0.37)
2 0.70* -0.07 1.08** 0.00 75:1–79:2 18
(0.35) (0.07) (0.27)
3 0.60** 0.10 0.07 0.06 75:1–79:2 18
(0.25) (0.11) (0.31)
4 0.96** -0.03 -0.17 0.00 75:3–79:2 16
(0.24) (0.12) (0.28)
Post–1979
0 -0.51** -0.01 0.58** 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
1 -0.71** -0.09 0.32** 0.00 79:3–98:3 76
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
2 -0.62** 0.07 0.03 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.11) (0.13) (0.17)
3 -0.64** 0.18* 0.14 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.14) (0.10) (0.20)
4 -0.76** -0.10 -0.20 0.00 79:3–98:2 76
(0.24) (0.16) (0.23)
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Notes: As in Table 2.
a After adjusting endpoints.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
40Table 7: Testing Federal Reserve’s Use of the
Spread Across Forecasters from SPF Using
Real-time Data and the Sample Since P. Vol-
cker. Equation is: et+h,t = βinqrt+h,t + εt+h











Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.
Notes: The sample is from the third quarter of 1979
to the second quarter of 1998 (76 observations). e de-
notes the forecast error from Green Book forecasts of
inﬂation. inqr denotes the interquartile range across
forecasters from the SPF. The actual value of inﬂation
is taken from the second revision available from the
real-time database from the Philadelphia Fed. t and
h index the date and horizon of the forecast respec-
tively. OLS estimates. Numbers in parentheses are ro-
bust standard errors calculated using Newey-West pro-
cedure with number of lags equal to h.
a The null hypothesis for the t–tests is φ = 0.5.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
41Table 8: Rationality Tests for Federal Reserve Inﬂation Forecasts
Under Asymmetric Quadratic Loss Using Real-time Data
Instruments φ J-stat p-value Wald test p-value
Pre–Volcker
Constant 0.25** - - 0.45 0.50
(0.11)
C + lagged error 0.16** 1.94 0.86 0.35 0.85
(0.07)
C + SPF median 0.21** 2.06 0.84 1.07 0.30
(0.09)
C + SPF inqr 0.24** 5.14 0.40 1.14 0.28
(0.09)
Since–Volcker
Constant 0.80** - - 2.06 0.72
(0.05)
C + lagged error 0.90** 8.63 0.28 7.29 0.50
(0.02)
C + SPF median 0.82** 9.26 0.23 4.12 0.84
(0.02)
C + SPF inqr 0.87** 9.21 0.24 3.11 0.92
(0.02)
Source: Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Notes: System GMM estimates imposing the restriction than the asymmetry
parameter is the same across horizons. Numbers in parentheses are robust stan-
dard errors calculated using Newey-West procedure with 5 lags. Horizons: (1)
Pre-Volcker only horizons one and two are used (two equations in the system);
(2) For the sample since Volcker horizons one to four are used (four equations in
the system). Samples: (1) For the pre-Volcker period the sample used goes from
1969:1 to 1979:2, except when the instrument used is lagged errors for which the
sample starts 1969:3; (2) For the period since Volcker the sample used goes from
1979:3 to 1998:2. Instruments: (1) the lagged error is the forecast error of the
Green Book Forecasts lagged (h+1) quarters, where h is the forecast horizon; (2)
SPF median is the consensus forecasts formed used the median across forecasters
from the SPF; (3) SPF inqr denotes the interquartile range across forecasters
from the SPF. The actual value of inﬂation is taken from the second revision
available from the real-time database from the Philadelphia Fed. J-stat is the
value of Hansen’s test statistic used to test the over-identifying restrictions, for
the p-value a chi-squared with ﬁve df is used for the pre Volcker period and
with 19 df for the post Volcker period. The null for the Wald tests is that the
asymmetry parameter is the same across horizons, for the p-value a chi-squared
with one df is used for the pre Volcker period and with three df for the period
since Volcker.
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05.
42Appendix C. Figures
Figure 1: One- and Four-step-ahead Green Book Forecasts Errors with Revised Data
Figure 2: One- and Four-step-ahead Green Book Forecasts Errors with Real-time Data
43Figure 3: OLS Breakdate Estimation (single break)
Figure 4: Symmetric and Asymmetric Quadratic Loss in Forecast Error Space
44Figure 5: Inﬂation and One-step-ahead Green Book Forecasts with Revised Data
Figure 6: Inﬂation and One-step-ahead Green Book Forecasts with Revised Data
45